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The Labyrinth of Blameworthiness
By BAILEY KUKLIN*
BLAMEWORTHINESS, OR CULPABILITY, IS CENTRAL TO THE
LAW, to morality, and, generally, to many social norms. Other than
for consensual obligations, such as contracts, a common intuition is
that a person should not be liable for harms caused to another person
or to the state if she has not engaged in blameworthy conduct. Fur-
thermore, if a person does harm another through blameworthy con-
duct, the intuition often extends to the belief that the degree of
culpability should be a factor in gauging a just requital.1 Malicious
homicide, for instance, deserves greater punishment than negligent
homicide does, and an intentional battery should occasion a more ex-
tensive liability than a comparable negligent injury. While there may
be proper arenas for strict liability, typically it is applied only for sub-
stantial reasons that trump the common urge to free a person from
responsibility to others for the consequences of her conduct that was
reasonable and not culpable.2
Even utilitarians, who champion norms that advance social wel-
fare irrespective of direct consideration of the culpability of the rele-
vant actors, may balk at unfettered strict liability independent of
blameworthiness. The famous utilitarian, J.S. Mill, favored a strong re-
* The author thanks his colleagues at Brooklyn Law School for very useful
comments and guidance at a faculty workshop.
1. That this intuition does not drive the usual rule for tort damages, as in negli-
gence, see infra note 57.
2. Strict products liability, for example, may be justified on economic, welfare
grounds. For one, the strict liability induces producers to internalize the costs of their
goods, thereby telegraphing to potential consumers more accurate information about
their true social costs and facilitating efficient markets. For a brief introduction, see Greg-
ory C. Keating, Strict Liability Wrongs, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS
292, 292–93 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014). For “most contemporary moral theorists of tort[,]
[s]trict liability is an embarrassment to their theories.” Id. at 294. Keating defends strict
torts liability. I believe the notion of dignitary harm discussed here would effectively get to
a similar place as does strict liability in many cases. Keating does not see such invasive
harms as wrongful in themselves. See id. at 300–05.
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gime of individual rights on the grounds that such a regime increases
overall social utility.3 Likewise, we may argue that a regime in which
the sword of Damocles hangs over us in the form of strict liability is
not as satisfying as one in which we have the comfort of knowing that
we are responsible only for consequences of our conduct that can be
fairly ascribed to our free, informed, and considered choices and ac-
tions. This greater control over our lives and destinies provides us a
sense of wellbeing.4
The laws of most legal regimes are largely a mixture of utilitarian,
consequentialist considerations and Kantian, deontic considerations.5
Deontic principles, centered on individual rights, dominate the cur-
rent jurisprudential and political debates.6 In embracing, delineating,
and applying deontic maxims of behavior, or, to some extent, utilita-
rian rules and standards as well, the conflicting liberty and security
interests of all affected parties are balanced.7 The reach of one per-
son’s liberty to do as she wishes ends when it becomes unacceptably
invasive of another person’s security: “Keep your fist well away from
my nose.” These two facets of freedom—liberty and security—are in-
evitably in conflict. They require tradeoffs that primarily focus on the
risk of harms that may occur as a result of a person’s conduct. The
exercise of one person’s liberty must not unduly interfere with an-
other person’s security by risking unwarranted physical, economic, or
psychic harm to her. Under Kantian principles in particular, whereby
every moral agent is entitled to equal respect and owes other agents
like respect,8 one also may not impose another type of harm, called a
dignitary harm, on another. One must respect others as moral equals
3. See JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 81, 176–200 (4th ed., London 1869).
4. The other side of the coin complicates this issue. A potential victim of a non-
blameworthy harm would feel more comfort knowing she will be compensated if harmed
despite the actor’s blamelessness. Thus a utilitarian, being a consequentialist, would weigh
the relative welfarist pros and cons of strict liability. A deep analysis of these would doubt-
lessly involve many twists and turns.
5. The detritus of historical and political developments, often unprincipled, inter-
feres with any overarching coherence or consistent common threads in legal systems.
6. Two modern classics of political theory reflect this orientation. See ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
7. See, e.g., MORRIS R. COHEN, Freedom: Its Meaning, in THE FAITH OF A LIBERAL 161,
163 (1946); WILLIAM LUCY, PHILOSOPHY OF PRIVATE LAW 407–08 (2007); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN,
EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 6 (1999); Jules L. Coleman, Second Thoughts and
Other First Impressions, in ANALYZING LAW 257, 304 (Brian Bix ed., 1998); Gerald J. Postema,
Introduction to PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 1, 6 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001).
8. See IMMANUEL KANT, The Metaphysics of Morals, in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 353, 557
(Mary J. Gregor trans., 1996) (1797).
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and treat them accordingly.9 Thus, four types of harm are gauged
when balancing liberty and security interests.
When the law is abridged and a person (or the state) is injured,
corrective justice in the private realm, and retribution or distributive
justice in the public one are predominant guides for requitals in mod-
ern legal systems. Blameworthiness is central to conceptions of princi-
pled punishment and is usually invoked in conceptions of corrective
justice, as in the standard of negligence based upon reasonableness. If
an actor is not sufficiently blameworthy, her harmful conduct is typi-
cally excused or justified.10 It is hard to imagine a viable and fair legal
regime that does not place blameworthiness in a starring role.11
While the concept of blameworthiness is often summoned, there
remains much controversy over its meaning and measure.12 This arti-
cle elaborates on two understandings ascribable to the concept. The
most established conception derives from Aristotle. He argues that a
person is not fairly responsible, and hence not blameworthy (or
creditworthy),13 for the consequences of her conduct that ensue from
her unavoidable ignorance or coercion.14 I call this “Responsibility
Blameworthiness.” A second conception receives less attention from
commentators. As suggested above, it derives from Kant’s deontic
9. See id. Dignitary harm differs from psychic harm. A stoic, her psyche well mas-
tered, may suffer no psychic discomfort from an outrageous insult.
10. For brief introductions to excuses and justifications, see, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER &
KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 88–91
(2009); MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 186–94, 247–51 (2002);
H.L.A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY
1, 13–14 (1968).
11. Even contract law, which is often said to be strict, has room for blameworthiness.
See infra note 21.
12. See, e.g., Jeremy Horder, Criminal Culpability: The Possibility of a General Theory, 12
LAW & PHIL. 193, 214–15 (1993); Douglas N. Husak & Craig A. Callender, Wilful Ignorance,
Knowledge, and the “Equal Culpability” Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the Principle of
Legality, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 29, 54–55; Arthur Ripstein, Justice and Responsibility, 17 CAN. J.L.
& JURISPRUDENCE 361, 361–62 (2004) (describing current theories of “moral accountabil-
ity”). For versions of blameworthiness, see, e.g., GEORGE SHER, IN PRAISE OF BLAME 9 (2006);
George P. Fletcher, The Recidivist Premium, 1(2) CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 54, 56–57 (1982).
13. In the Oxford English (US) Dictionary, the definitions of “responsible” include:
“Being the primary cause of something and so able to be blamed or credited for it . . . .
Morally accountable for one’s behavior . . . .” [online version]. Blameworthiness draws
most of the attention in this article. Responsible, OXFORD DICTIONARY, https://
en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ us/responsible (last visited Sept. 24, 2016) [https:/
/perma.cc/TZ4W-L74N].
14. See ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics bk. III, ch. 1 (Ethica Nicomachea), in THE BASIC
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 935, 964–67 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941). See generally PETER CANE,
RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALITY 65 (2002); R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
MORAL SENTIMENTS 128 (1994).
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principles. Under his categorical imperative, every moral agent has a
priceless dignity that commands equal respect.15 Violation of this duty
of respect generates a dignitary harm and involves, what I call, “Disre-
spect Blameworthiness.”
Each of these two primary conceptions of blameworthiness has
two aspects. First, as even the brief description above makes evident,
under Aristotle’s conception of Responsibility Blameworthiness, Br,
one of its aspects is diminished blameworthiness attributable to a per-
son’s conduct owing to her unavoidable ignorance, Bri,16 while an-
other one spotlights any coercion she was operating under, Brc.
Second, under Kant’s elaboration of the duty to respect others, one
aspect of the notion of Disrespect Blameworthiness, Bd, stems from
the actor’s disrespectful attitude towards another person, Bda, while
the second one issues from her disrespectful treatment of another
person, Bdt.
All four of these aspects of blameworthiness have scalar qualities.
They are matters of degree. Consequently, when we speak of a person
as being blameworthy, we can further unpack this assertion into con-
stituent parts with separate gradations. Two people, therefore, may be
equally blameworthy overall, but in different ways. For example, one
agent may treat another person with substantial disrespect while con-
sidering her an equal, such as where the actor beneficently paternal-
izes a loved and admired one against her will.17 Another actor may
treat another person with respect while considering her an inferior,
such as where the actor helps the other person undergo a beneficial,
voluntary, painful medical procedure because she enjoys seeing that
other, “inferior” person suffer.18 Even if we judge these forms of
blameworthiness as equal overall in some sense, we may still decide
that the requitals for the ensuing harms should differ in various ways.
We may, for instance, protect against a different range or extent of
harms for one form of blameworthiness than for another. One aim of
this paper is to unpack some of the difficulties we face in attempting
to make these distinctions.
15. See KANT, supra note 8, at 557.
16. Thus, Bri stands for Responsibility Blameworthiness (Br) with respect to ignorance
(i). Immediately below, Bda stands for Disrespect Blameworthiness (Bd) with respect to atti-
tude (a).
17. The agent may be respectful despite the paternalism because, for instance, she
would wish to be equally paternalized if the roles were reversed.
18. This example derives from Graham. See Peter A. Graham, In Defense of Objectivism
about Moral Obligation, 121 ETHICS 88, 94 n.14 (2010).
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I. Responsibility Blameworthiness, Br
The first aspect of Aristotle’s conception of Responsibility Blame-
worthiness implies that an actor’s accountability for her conduct di-
minishes to the extent that it constitutes an acceptable response to
coercive forces. These forces may stem from external sources, such as
physical compulsion or economic duress, or internal ones, including
irresistible impulse or akrasia, or some combination of these two
sources. The second prong of Aristotle’s conception, unavoidable ig-
norance, has similar origins. It may come from external causes, such
as fraud or deception, or internal ones, including self-deception or
naturally disposed cognitive distortions, or a combination of them.19
When an actor’s accountability is diminished by shortfalls in
these two facets of Responsibility Blameworthiness, the law typically
establishes a threshold above which the actor is held responsible. This
level may effectively vary depending on the legal duty at issue. As ap-
plied, different torts,20 contracts,21 or crimes may have different
thresholds.22 The reasonable person is often invoked as the standard:
If a reasonable person in the actor’s position would have resisted the
forces of coercion and sufficiently addressed any initial ignorance,
then the actor is held legally responsible for the injurious conse-
quences of the failure to do so.23 In deciding whether to act in the
face of her impaired conditions for full responsibility, the reasonable
19. Aristotle is wary of finding that internal sources of coercion or ignorance under-
mine voluntariness. For one, this may undermine the ascription of beneficial acts as praise-
worthy. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 14, bk. III, ch. 1, at 967. Current cognitive science makes
it difficult to set aside our inner workings.
20. For example, compare the differing “intent” requirements for tortious trespass
and malicious prosecution. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 47–49, 1223–25 (2000);
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 33–39, 882–84 (5th ed.
1984). That “intent” requires knowledge, see id. at 34–36.
21. Responsibility for breach of contract is often said to be strict. See, e.g., RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235 (1981); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.8 (4th
ed. 2004). Nonetheless, many commentators have found the actual law of contracts to
include substantial room for notions of fault. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Role of
Fault in Contract Law: Unconscionability, Unexpected Circumstances, Interpretation, Mistake, and
Nonperformance, in FAULT IN AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW 82, 82 (Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel
Porat eds., 2010) (“fault is a basic building block of contract law, and pervades the field”);
TONY WEIR, The Staggering March of Negligence, in THE LAW OF OBLIGATION 97, 122 (Peter
Cane & Jane Stapleton eds., 1998); George M. Cohen, The Fault that Lies Within Our Contract
Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1445, 1445 (2009).
22. “[T]here is no single conception [of ‘legal responsibility’].” JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISH-
MENT AND DESERT 106 (1973).
23. That legal responsibility turns on what we may reasonably expect of one another,
see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 108 (1996); Ripstein, supra
note 12, at 361 (“reciprocity conception of responsibility”).
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person considers the nature of her legal duties and the known risks to
others. More caution is called for when egregious physical injury to
another is in the offing than when an innocuous touching may ensue.
Once the responsibility threshold is surpassed, the degree of the
actor’s responsibility is normally not taken into account in gauging
private law requitals. Negligence law reflects this.24 The general rule is
that once the actor is found to be sufficiently responsible for her con-
duct, however close to the threshold, the victim is entitled to full re-
covery for her injuries. This is one justification that often applies:
Though the actor may not be fully blameworthy for her conduct, the
victim is entirely blameless. Perhaps in a world free of the critical epi-
stemic difficulties in judging the relative responsibility of the actor
and victim for particular harms, blameworthiness would play a role in
measuring requitals. Comparative negligence is a substantial step in
this direction.25 Unlike usual tort and contract doctrine,26 criminal
law, which puts blameworthiness on center stage, often takes into ac-
count the actor’s relative responsibility or culpability for her conduct
when meting punishment.27
Though relative degrees of coercion and ignorance are usually
considered factors that affect the extent of responsibility of an actor
and, for that matter, the victim, all persons are not the same when it
comes to facing these hindering constraints. A particular person’s
constitution may significantly surpass the threshold standard of the
ordinary reasonable person in specific circumstances. She may be un-
usually resistant to particular forces of coercion or she may be knowl-
edgeable about the risks of her contemplated choice much beyond
the average person. For example, as an adept in martial arts, she may
not be the least bit intimidated by a specific physical threat, or as a
psychologist she may be especially sensitive to the internal impulses
that bedevil untrained people. With respect to ignorance, she may be
a sophisticated expert who is not taken in by the deceptive claims of
24. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 20, at 349; Postema, supra note 7, at 3; James
Goudkamp, The Spurious Relationship Between Blameworthiness and Liability for Negligence, 28
MELB. U. L. REV. 343, 343 (2004). But see John C.P. Goldberg, Misconduct, Misfortune, and
Just Compensation: Weinstein on Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2034, 2042 (1997) (“[C]ourts . . .
have demonstrated sensitivity to the distorting effects of the full compensation principle by
varying the scope and stringency of proximate cause doctrine in accordance with the na-
ture of the defendant’s wrongdoing.”).
25. See generally, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 20, at 503–06; KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, at
468–79.
26. Punitive damages, having quasi-criminal law overtones, are the most notable ex-
ception to this generalization. See infra note 52.
27. See infra note 57.
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the other party, or she may have studied and mastered some of the
cognitive distortions that plague humans. Indeed, the common law
takes into account some of the unusual strengths of the parties. Thus,
in judging whether a party’s conduct meets the legal standard for an
excuse, the law ascribes to the reasonable person surrogate some of
the actual person’s superior qualities, such as whether she is, or holds
herself out as, a relevant expert.28 Furthermore, under a causation
requirement, legal doctrine demands that a claimant’s conduct actu-
ally results from the effects of ignorance or coercion.29
When the law accommodates the reduced degree of an actor’s
Responsibility Blameworthiness, Br, it may separate out the elements
of ignorance, Bri, and coercion, Brc. Each of the two factors could be
independently gauged on a scale from, say, 0.0 to 1.0, with 1.0 being
total freedom from ignorance or coercion. Each aspect could be
weighted differently for particular types of conduct. For battery, as an
instance, foreseeability (ignorance) of likely harm may be weightier
than freedom from coercion. This would mean that the agent’s fore-
seeability of possible harms must be greater and closer to ideal (1.0),
than must be her freedom from coercion. In other words, to avoid
being held responsible and liable, we are more sympathetic to the
claim, “I didn’t realize the victim was put at risk by my conduct,” than
we are to the claim, “I couldn’t help myself.” In sum, weighing relates
to the ontological question regarding the extent to which there is ig-
norance or coercion, whereas weighting relates to the normative issue
of how much (dis)value society ought to ascribe to a particular igno-
rance or coercion.30 Hence, say, for a wrongful harm from a battery to
be sufficiently blameworthy and thereby inexcusable, it must be that
Bri = 0.5 and Brc = 0.3. Since the lack of ignorance is weightier here,
more important than the absence of coercion, we require it to weigh
more, be more present, for the actor to be declared responsible.
The two factors of ignorance and coercion may be weighted dif-
ferently depending on whether they stem from external or internal
sources, or the nature of the external or internal sources. For in-
28. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 20, at 290; KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, at 185–86.
29. Regarding ignorance, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537 (1977)
(discussing fraudulent misrepresentation); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 167
(1981) (discussing misrepresentation). For coercion, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 174–75, 177 (1981) (discussing duress and undue influence).
30. For more on the distinction between weighting and weighing, see ROBERT NOZICK,
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 294 (1981); Bailey Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, 9 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 375, 428 n.181 (2015); Andrei Marmor, On the Limits of Rights, 16 LAW &
PHIL. 1, 13 (1997).
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stance, regarding coercion, Brc, responsibility for conduct may have a
threshold of, say, Brc = 0.3 for external coercion such as physical du-
ress and, say, Brc = 0.1 for internal coercion such as impulse. To suffice
as excuses, external coercion must be quite substantial while internal
impulse must be nearly irresistible.31 As another example, excusing a
contractual commitment may have a threshold of, for example, Bri =
0.5 for externally induced ignorance such as from misrepresentation,
and Bri = 0.2 for internally centered ignorance, such as from mental
inability and cognitive biases. This methodology becomes further
complicated when the ignorance springs from a combination of exter-
nal and internal factors. A merchant, for instance, may knowingly ex-
ploit human foibles by selling a flashy, shoddy product in a plush
showroom with flattering, attractive salespersons. The nature of exter-
nal or internal sources may also be relevant, as where physical duress
is considered weightier than economic duress. The possible permuta-
tions are manifold. Of the two excusing factors, ignorance and coer-
cion, it seems that existing law primarily emphasizes the need for
foreseeability (lack of ignorance).32 In torts and criminal law, issues
regarding freedom from coercion receive little judicial attention until
31. “Put most generally, a central behavioral morality question for law would be ‘Can
internal causes ever exculpate?’ The predominant answer in both law and legal philosophy
has been ‘no’ . . . .” Amanda C. Pustilnik, Rethinking Unreasonableness: A Comment on Nita
Farahany’s “Law and Behavioral Morality”, in EVOLUTION AND MORALITY 166, 167 (James E.
Fleming & Sanford Levinson eds., 2012. For exceptions, see Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, A
Case Study in Neuroscience and Responsibility, in EVOLUTION AND MORALITY, 194, 205–06
(2012).
32. “Perhaps the most important of the capacities that is requisite to tort liability is the
capacity for foresight.” RIPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 94. “On the view I will defend, foresight is
not required because it is a general condition of agency. Instead, it is implicit in the idea of
fair terms of interaction.” Id. at 105. See also Stephen D. Sugarman, Rethinking Tort Doctrine:
Visions of a Restatement (Fourth) of Torts, 50 UCLA L. REV. 585, 602 (2002) (“It is widely
agreed that one cannot really be blamed for harming someone when, at the time one
acted, one did not anticipate and could not reasonably have anticipated, that acting in the
way one did risked harm to another.”). In these situations, “it seems unfair to say the defen-
dant should have acted differently.” Id. While Scanlon questions the moral connection
between intention and foresight, see T.M. Scanlon & Jonathan Dancy, Intention and Permissi-
bility, 74 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 301, 305–06 (2000), Dancy disagrees with him, see id. at
333–34.
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it gets rather extreme.33 In contract law, the modern trend is to be
more attentive to the victim’s claim of duress.34
The two excusing factors in Responsibility Blameworthiness, igno-
rance and coercion, occasion many more intricacies. Each factor may
be weighted differently depending on whether the claim is civil or
criminal, or the nature of the claim or remedy sought, such as battery
versus wrongful death or homicide. First, for criminal battery, Respon-
sibility Blameworthiness for ignorance and coercion may be Bri = 0.5
and Brc = 0.3, respectively, while for civil battery, Bri = 0.4 and Brc = 0.2.
In other words, for battery one must be more responsibility blamewor-
thy for criminal liability than for civil liability. Excuses and justifica-
tions are more readily available in the public law context. A warrant
for this difference stems from the varied deontic aims of civil and
criminal liability. Civil liability primarily seeks to compensate the vic-
tim pursuant to corrective justice,35 whereas criminal liability means to
punish the actor pursuant to retribution or distributive justice.36 Sec-
33. “Relatively few [tort] cases have dealt with the problem of consent given under
duress. . . . [T]here has been no discussion of its place in the law of torts.” KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 20, at 121. “The [tort] cases to date in which duress has been found to render
the consent ineffective have involved those forms of duress that are quite drastic in their
nature and that clearly and immediately amount to an overpowering of the will.” RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B cmt. j (1977).
For the Model Penal Code’s approach to coercion (duress), see DUBBER, supra note
10, at 251–59. “[D]uress is limited to coercion caused by persons (personal duress), and
not to compulsion by natural causes or circumstances (circumstantial duress).” Id. at 253.
“[C]oercion is broader . . . than duress . . . .” Peter Westen, “Freedom” and “Coercion”—Virtue
Words and Vice Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541, 591. “Apart from duress, English and American
courts have been loathed to recognize excuses based on external coercion, in particular,
external coercion generated by natural circumstances.” FLETCHER, supra note 23, at 106.
“The law is . . . much more cautious in admitting ‘defects of the will’ than ‘defect in knowl-
edge’ as qualifying or excluding criminal responsibility.” H.L.A. HART, Legal Responsibility
and Excuses, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 10, at 28, 33.
34. “Courts originally restricted duress to threats involving loss of life, mayhem or
imprisonment, but these restrictions have been greatly relaxed and, in order to constitute
duress, the threat need only be improper with the rule stated in [the next section].” RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 cmt. a (1981). For the twisty lines drawn by
modern courts, see id. §§ 175, 176; FARNSWORTH, supra note 21, §§ 4.16–4.18. This greater
generosity in contracts as compared to torts and criminal law may be due to the weaker
available requitals: avoidance, rescission, and restitution. See id. § 4.19.
35. “[C]orrective justice has usually been thought of as comprising those principles
that directly govern private transactions between individuals. In developed legal systems,
these principles are generally embodied in the law of contract, torts, and unjust enrich-
ment.” Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice, 77
IOWA L. REV. 515, 515 (1992). See generally Jules Coleman et al., Theories of the Common Law of
Torts, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ win2015/
entries/tort-theories/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) [https://perma.cc/6DJF-SBVD].
36. See generally Hugo Adam Bedau & Erin Kelly, Punishment, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL., available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/punishment/ (last
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ond, for homicide, the threshold for coercion, Brc, may be nearly 0.0.
Here, in other words, coercion, however great, almost never excuses
homicide, while foreseeability (ignorance) remains as a higher thresh-
old factor at, say, Bri = 0.3. Yet, as above, we may distinguish external
coercion (e.g., physical duress) from internal coercion (e.g., insanity,
irresistible impulse), establishing a lower threshold of responsibility
for one than for the other, or for one type of external or internal
coercion than for another type. Provocation by the victim, when seen
as a form of coercion,37 raises the threshold for Brc. Looking at
(nearly) absolute liability, such as possession of contraband, the
threshold for ignorance may be, say, Bri = 0.0, while the threshold for
coercion remains, say, Brc = 0.3.
The excusing factors in Responsibility Blameworthiness may be
weighted differently depending on the type of harm at issue. For dig-
nitary harm from an assault or defamation, Responsibility Blamewor-
thiness may be set at Bri = 0.5 and Brc = 0.3, while for psychic harm
from the same conduct, Responsibility Blameworthiness is set at Bri =
0.6 and Brc = 0.3. In this instance, the foreseeability of the psychic
harm must be greater than the foreseeability of the dignitary harm.
Under existing law, courts have struggled with four distinctions
among foreseeable harms.38 First, the courts have considered the type
of harm (i.e., physical, economic, psychic, or dignitary). If some type
of harm is foreseeable, is the actor responsible for other types of
visited Mar. 7, 2016) [https://perma.cc/8U4P-8XUJ]. The distinctions among corrective,
retributive, and distributive justice are controversial. See, e.g., IZHAK ENGLARD, CORRECTIVE
AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE FROM ARISTOTLE TO MODERN TIMES 9–10 (2009); WOJCIECH
SADURSKI, GIVING DESERT ITS DUE 25–36 (1985); C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT
5 (1987); George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 51, 57–59 (1999); John Gardner, Corrective Justice, Corrected, 12 DIRITTO & QUESTIONI
PUBBLICHE 9, 13–15 (2012); Ronen Perry, The Third Form of Justice, 23 CAN. L.J. & JURISPRU-
DENCE 233, 242–47 (2010). Consequentialist aims of civil and criminal liability, such as
deterrence, are here set aside.
37. “It is proposed both that provocation justifies retaliatory action and that it causes
such action. Moreover, the causal imputation commonly carries an implication of compul-
sion, an implication that can be made to account (at least in part) for the justificatory
element in provocation . . . .” MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE 257–58 (1988).
Some commentators see provocation as a partial excuse, others as a partial justification.
Both views have been criticized. See Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The
Case for a Criminal Law Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1212 (1994) (with
citations).
38. To put the issues more generally, “it is difficult to see how the principle of reason-
able foreseeability ensures that liability only arises in respect of avoidable risks.”
Goudkamp, supra note 24, at 347. See id. at 347–50.
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harms that are not (as) foreseeable?39 To draw even finer lines: If re-
covery for freestanding harms requires, say, Bri = 0.5, when a specific
type of harm meets this threshold, should the threshold for other
types of ensuing harms decrease, or the threshold for other types of
harms decrease to different levels for each respective type of harm?40
Second, the courts have considered the manner of harm. If a particu-
lar type of harm is foreseeable (e.g., physical), is the actor responsible
for that type of harm when it occurs in an unforeseeable manner?
Third, the courts have considered the extent of harm. Is the actor
responsible for a particular type of harm that is more extensive than
was foreseeable?41 Fourth, the person harmed. If harm is foreseeable
to one person, does responsibility extend to a similar harm to an un-
foreseeable person?42 Under a wide range of circumstances, these per-
mutations could play out in very complex interplays of Bri and Brc.43
39. “A person should not be liable for the unforeseen consequences of all unlawful
acts. He should be responsible for the unforeseen consequences of acts that are unlawful
because they are unjust to others because they harm or appropriate what belongs to them.”
JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT, UNJUST EN-
RICHMENT 195 (2006).
40. Goldberg and Zipursky relatedly assert that psychic harm for defamation is para-
sitic on dignitary harm. See JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORTS 311 n.4
(2010). There may be another way to get to this idea. Perhaps the threshold in defamation
for responsibility (and disrespect) for dignitary harm is lower than for psychic harm. If so,
without meeting the threshold for dignitary harm, the threshold for psychic harm will not
be met.
41. The problem with making defendants liable for unusual injuries is . . . that it
would encumber liberty too much, as people seeking to avoid wronging others
would need to moderate their activity to too great an extent. By contrast, liability
for the full extent of injury, no matter how surprising, places no burden on liberty.
For no extra precautions are required to avoid severe injuries than are required
to avoid less severe ones.
Ripstein, supra note 7, at 90. But once a defendant is found liable for an unexpected extent
of injury, any ensuing reduction in her resources diminishes her future range of choices.
42. The leading case addressing this issue is Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99
(N.Y. 1928). For the related problem of transferred intent, see DOBBS, supra note 20, at
75–79; KEETON ET. AL., supra note 20, at 37–39. “[T]he best explanation of why the intent
to shoot the desired victim should be ‘transferred’ to the actual victim is that both inten-
tions are equally culpable.” Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609,
620 (1984). “[I]t is not really that intent is ‘transferred.’ Where the doctrine applies, the
defendant’s intent was sufficient all along.” Lawrence Crocker, A Retributive Theory of Crimi-
nal Causation, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 65, 81 (1994) (footnote omitted). Discussing
Palsgraf, Hurd and Moore opine, “[t]he best thing to do with the doctrine of transferred
intent is thus to get rid of it entirely.” Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Negligence in the
Air, 3 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 333, 390 (2002) (footnote omitted).
43. Weinrib offers a guideline. “[W]hen the plaintiff’s loss, although caused by the
defendant’s wrongdoing, is not within the ambit of what makes it wrongful, the defen-
dant’s conduct cannot be said to be wrongful with respect to that plaintiff’s loss.” Ernest J.
Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice, 1 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 1, 10 (2000).
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More generally, we could further conjure up extraordinarily entan-
gled interrelations among various combinations of external and inter-
nal coercion which are interconnected to intricately entangled
interrelations among external and internal ignorance.
Setting aside practical problems and insuperable epistemic issues,
if the level of the actor’s Responsibility Blameworthiness, Br, is exactly
discernable, then a case might be made for reducing the requital in
some proportion to the extent that Br falls short of ideal.44 For an
example that lumps together Bri and Brc into Br, to trim complications,
say that the threshold for a requital is Br = 0.5, and, in a particular
case, Br = 0.9. One might then consider reducing the requital by, per-
haps, 10% per 0.1 increment to roughly account for the shortfall from
the ideal conditions for responsible choice. For each 0.1 drop of Br
below 1.0, the requital would decrease by 10% until at Br = 0.5 (the
minimum threshold for responsibility) the requital would be based on
50% of the harm. The reductions need not be linear. Of course, as
suggested by some of the analysis above, this could lead to untold
complexities from combinations of factors. Further labyrinthine con-
volutions could be added by the permutations from overlaying the var-
iations in Disrespect Blameworthiness, Bd, discussed below.
Reducing requitals in proportion to an actor’s shortfall from the
ideal conditions for Responsibility Blameworthiness strongly protects
the actor’s liberty interest. In a real, if somewhat crude, sense she will
be held liable only for wrongful harm to the extent that she could
anticipate and avoid it. She is in significant control of her exposure to
Moore suggests that one could deal with the “vagaries in the meaning of ‘foreseeable’
[by] . . . creat[ing] a sliding scale foreseeability test, less probability being required for
more serious harms, more probability for less serious harms.” MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING
BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 364 (1997). We might also vary the stan-
dard of foreseeability in light of the purpose of the agent’s conduct. Where her activity is
socially beneficial and her minimization of risks is costly, “the probability with which harm
to the claimant must be foreseeable before his rights can be said to have been violated will
be higher than where the defendant’s activity is pointless or unlawful.” ROBERT STEVENS,
TORTS AND RIGHTS 207 (2007) (footnote omitted). “Reasonable foresight, in relation to
culpability, is therefore a practical notion and we may term the harm, the risk of which is
sufficient to influence the conduct of a prudent man, ‘foreseeable in the practical sense.’”
H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 263 (2d ed. 1985) (footnote omit-
ted). The “prudent man” is, of course, a society-created person reflecting society’s values.
44. Kolber questions the all-or-nothing liability responses of the law. See Adam Kolber,
Smooth and Bumpy Laws, 102 CAL. L. REV. 655, 656-57 (2014). In proposing a culpability-
based criminal code, Alexander and Ferzan state, “After a jury determines which legally
protected interests the actor believed himself to be risking, the jury will need to discount
these interests by the actor’s belief as to the magnitudes of the various risks he was impos-
ing.” ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 10, at 282.
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the risk of requitals. She is free to act without the fear of liability for
harms or their extent; as such, we cannot truly say, “You are entirely
blameworthy for causing that injury,” or would say, “You are not that
blameworthy for it.” On the other hand, let us turn our attention to
the security interests of the wrongfully harmed party. She, most often,
is not blameworthy in the least.45 We must then decide whether to
sacrifice some of the blameless victim’s security interest for the sake of
the moderately blameless actor’s liberty interest.46 Who has the
stronger claim? What are the consequences? What types of considera-
tions count?
If we consider requital principles that do not curtail any of the
victim’s security interest that is at risk because of the harming actor’s
shortfall from full Responsibility Blameworthiness, how might the re-
medial standards address this? One possibility is to allow the victim a
full, undiminished recovery for wrongful harms once the threshold
for requital is reached. This is the usual rule under the common law
conception of corrective justice.47 The element of blameworthiness
usually plays no role in the gauge of compensation.48 Then, if we
choose to account for the actor’s Responsibility Blameworthiness be-
yond the threshold minimum, we could do so by increasing the vic-
tim’s award. We could add a surplus to the victim’s recovery, granting
her more than the measure of her actual, wrongful harms. This step
goes beyond our ordinary understanding of corrective justice and,
rather, suggests the idea of distributive justice.49 As an example, to
implement this step when the threshold for Responsibility Blamewor-
thiness is Br = 0.5, and the particular actor’s blameworthiness is Br =
0.9, we might add an extra proportionate amount to the victim’s re-
covery. Though the actor would object to the enhanced award with,
“But the victim wasn’t hurt that much,” we (sometimes) may respond,
45. When the victim is somewhat blameworthy as well, the tort doctrines of contribu-
tory and comparative negligence apply. See generally, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 20, at 494–98,
503–06; KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, at 451–62, 468–79.
46. See NEIL MACCORMICK, The Obligation of Reparation, in LEGAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL
DEMOCRACY 212, 214 (1982).
47. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1977); DOBBS, supra note 20, at
1047–48.
48. See infra note 57.
49. Distributive justice, under Aristotle, “is manifested in distributions of honour or
money or the other things that fall to be divided among those who have a share in the
constitution . . . .” ARISTOTLE, supra note 14, bk. III, ch. 2, at 1005–06. Today it often
reaches the distributive effects of all norms. See generally, e.g., Julian Lamont & Christi
Favor, Distributive Justice, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
fall2014/entries/justice-distributive/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2016) [https://perma.cc/AXM4-
S8AZ].
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“Yes, but that was a matter of moral luck,50 and, in this particular case,
the degree of your blameworthiness is not adequately reflected by the
victim’s actual injuries.”51 How much should the recovery be height-
ened under this approach? This is a tough question. Should we add,
say, 10% to the victim’s recovery for every 0.1 increment above the
threshold of Br of the actor’s blameworthiness? If so, and if the thresh-
old is Br = 0.5, and the actor’s Br = 0.7, then we would add 20% to the
victim’s recovery. Instead of simply adding increments, should there
be a multiplier? Should the extra amount be nonlinear? Progressive?
Regressive? Even tougher than the calculation above is of how much
we might reduce the victim’s recovery for Responsibility Blameworthi-
ness that falls below the ideal, Br = 1.0.
The exploration of the possibility of adding a surplus to requitals
for heightened Responsibility Blameworthiness is rather academic
and, under existing social norms, unrealistic. Epistemic problems still
aside, why should a victim recover for more than her actual harms?
We apparently allow this for punitive damages, but this doctrine is
distinguishable. While not generally acknowledged by the courts, pu-
nitive damages arguably provide a means to requite the victim’s digni-
tary, psychic, and other harms in extreme cases of disrespectfulness
when the standard causes of action do not fully protect against these
types of harms, such as for a malicious prosecution.52 Malice, of sorts,
is usually an element of the claim for punitive damages.53 Sometimes,
however, punitive damages are greater than a just requital for the vic-
tim’s own dignitary, psychic, and other harms. In these cases, we grant
the victim the privilege of recovering punitive damages as a private
attorney general for, arguably, wrongful harms to the general pub-
50. “Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his
control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can
be called moral luck. Such luck can be good or bad.” Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in MOR-
TAL QUESTIONS 24, 26 (1979). See generally, e.g., CANE, supra note 14, at 65–78; BERNARD
WILLIAMS, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK 20 (1981); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipur-
sky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123 (2007); Stephen J. Morse, Reasons,
Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363; Norvin Richards, Luck and De-
sert, 95 MIND 198 (1986).
51. Sometimes, of course, moral luck will cut against the actor. The ordinary requital
standard will lead to legal relief beyond the degree of the actor’s blameworthiness. Ac-
counting for these varied circumstances adds yet another level of complexity.
52. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, at 9; Bailey Kuklin, Punishment: The Civil
Perspective of Punitive Damages, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (1989).
53. “Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the
defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1977). See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 20, at 1062–66; KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 20, at 9–10.
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lic.54 These also are actual harms, the problem being that they may be
so dispersed among a wide public that, as with the law of public nui-
sance, we decline for practical reasons to grant standing to sue to eve-
ryone who has been similarly harmed.55 Considering instances when
an actor produces remediable, wrongful harms with a level of respon-
sibility above the minimum threshold, what is the actual harm to the
direct victim or public? Some ensuing harms may be readily identifi-
able. The victim or public, knowing of the actor’s heightened respon-
sibility for her manifested willingness to put them at risk, may react
with expenditures for increased security measures and, if bad enough,
suffer from physical illness or psychic distress. A society may aptly
adopt principles that protect individuals from these and other physi-
cal, economic, psychic,56 and dignitary harms. Here, however, we have
been addressing whether to increase a victim’s recovery for the actor’s
heightened responsibility irrespective of whether, or the extent to
which, any of these other ensuing harms have been shown. Realisti-
cally calculating any such other consequential harms seems to be a
largely futile endeavor that is crude at best. Once again, these con-
cerns do not appear within the usual reach of corrective justice but,
rather, more as matters for distributive justice or retribution.57
This exhausting, microscopic examination of the role of Respon-
sibility Blameworthiness demonstrates that there are many intricate
ways to account, in principle, for this moral consideration. This wide
range allows for innumerable choices in the adoption of substantive
and requital principles that strike a fair, reasonable balance between
one’s liberty and security interests. There are many plausible bound-
54. I pursue the argument that punishment is to requite wrongful harms to the gen-
eral public in my manuscript “Public Requitals: Corrective Justice, Retribution, and Distrib-
utive Justice” (on file with author).
55. “No better definition of a public nuisance has been suggested than that of an act
or omission ‘which obstructs or causes inconvenience or damages to the public in the
exercise of rights common to all Her Majesty’s subjects.’” KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, at
643 (footnote omitted). For the practical reasons supporting the rule that public nuisances
can be redressed only by public officials, see id. at 646.
56. Nozick and Rawls, among others, identify a “fright” theory of criminality, justifying
punishment for the psychic harm to the public. See NOZICK, supra note 6, at 65–71; John
Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 105, 107 (H.B. Acton ed.,
1969).
57. See supra note 36. “Another important difference between tort and criminal law is
that tort generally provides the same sanction (compensatory damages) regardless of the
defendant’s culpability, while criminal law provides a sanction (punishment) that is pro-
portional to the defendant’s culpability.” Kenneth W. Simons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort,
and Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 273, 296–97 (1996). Simons goes on to offer a deontological
justification for this difference, but expresses caution about the award of punitive damages.
See id. at 297.
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ary lines between one person’s freedom and another’s, between one
person’s autonomy, or “autonomy space”,58 and another’s that can sat-
isfy the duty to equally respect one another. But there are certainly
limits. At the pole where freedom from ignorance and coercion do
not matter for responsibility (Bri = 0.0, Brc = 0.0), the actor is absolutely
liable. When applicable, her liberty in this regard is severely truncated
while the victim’s security is greatly expanded. In being liable for
harms she could neither anticipate nor control, the actor’s autonomy
is essentially disrespected. At the opposite pole, where freedom from
ignorance and coercion must be ideal for responsibility (Bri = 1.0, Brc =
1.0), the actor is virtually never liable. At the very least, everyone suf-
fers some human quirks that foreclose fully informed choices and
freedom to act. Freed from liability, the actor’s liberty is greatly ex-
panded while the victim’s security is severely constricted. Unable to
recover for harms produced by even grossly blameworthy conduct, the
victim’s autonomy is essentially disrespected. Somewhere between
these extreme poles, thresholds for Responsibility Blameworthiness
must be drawn. Doubtlessly, the standards will consider principles,
consequences, and practical matters. The line-drawing debate has
been going on for a long time.
II. Disrespect Blameworthiness, Bd
Disrespect Blameworthiness, like Responsibility Blameworthiness,
has two aspects. Pursuant to Kant’s categorical imperative, a person by
virtue of her rational capability is a moral agent entitled to respect as
an equal to all other moral agents, and to be so treated.59 Hence,
moral agents are blameworthy for failure to maintain a respectful atti-
tude towards others, Bda,60 or to treat others with respect, Bdt. Such
failures constitute dignitary harms. They may also produce other types
of harms. From the insult and defamation implied by disrespectful
conduct or attitude, a distressed victim may suffer physical and psychic
58. I develop this “autonomy space” metaphor at length in Constructing Autonomy,
supra note 30, at 393–416.
59. See supra note 8.
60. Kant emphasizes a criminal’s “inner wickedness.” KANT, supra note 8, at 474. See
DAVID BOONIN, THE PROBLEM OF PUNISHMENT 96 (2008) (discussing motive); T.M. SCAN-
LON, MORAL DIMENSIONS: PERMISSIBILITY, MEANING, BLAME 128 (2008) (discussing an
“agent’s attitudes toward others”); Michael Moore, Victims and Retribution: A Reply to Profes-
sor Fletcher, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 65, 66 (1999) (discussing “inner thoughts”); Japa Pallik-
kathayil, Deriving Morality from Politics: Rethinking the Formula of Humanity, 121 ETHICS 116,
131–32 (2010) (discussing “duties not to pose as morally superior to others”).
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harms.61 Economic harms may also follow. She may be induced to
make expenditures for protective measures or may lose economic and
social opportunities owing to the negative reactive responses of
onlookers.
The standard three types of harms—physical, economic, and
psychic—may occur without the actor being responsibility blamewor-
thy at all. She may be justifiably ignorant of the potential conse-
quences of her choice to act, which ultimately harms a victim.62 No
one in her position would have foreseen the risk to others, except,
perhaps, Rube Goldberg. Conversely, her negligibly risky conduct
might be a reasonable response to a credible, dire, inescapable threat.
Hence, under these situations Aristotelian principles would find her
not responsible, not blameworthy, for her conduct. Br = ~ 0.0. On the
other hand, when it comes to a dignitary harm produced by disrespect
(Bd), the actor’s ignorance or coercion is less exculpating. This is es-
pecially apparent with respect to a disrespectful attitude (Bda). As a
state of mind, an attitude cannot be simply a product of vindicating
coercion. Nor can an attitude of disrespect be a product of acceptable
ignorance of the moral equality of all rational beings. The categorical
imperative is unconditional. It is, after all, categorical, and therefore
independent of a person’s inclination, motive, or desire. Ignorance or
coercion cannot be fully excusing. We might partially pardon one’s
disrespectful attitude, as where a morally uneducated person is nur-
tured in a classist or racist society, but perhaps short of brainwashing,
we would still hold the person blameworthy to some extent for disre-
specting another. The apt requital may account for her understanda-
ble ignorance or attitude stemming from skewed circumstances, but
she will not be let off the hook entirely.
A similar case, though perhaps less straightforward, can be made
for disrespectful treatment (Bdt). “Treatment” refers to “[t]he manner
in which someone behaves toward or deals with someone or some-
thing.”63 Likewise, “manner” refers to “[a] person’s outward bearing
61. See Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 512 (1992).
On the other hand, a dignitary harm may be protected independently of whether the
victim suffers associated psychic or other harms. A tortious assault, for instance, does not
require the victim to experience fright or fear. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 24
cmt. b (1977).
62. I ignore the de minimis “foreseeability” that stems from the knowledge that totally
unforeseeably occurrences sometimes happen. See David G. Owen, Figuring Foreseeability, 44
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1277, 1288 (2009) (discussing “foreseeing” the unexpected).
63. Treatment, OXFORD ENGLISH (US) DICTIONARY (2016), https://en.oxforddictionar
ies.com/definition/treatment (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/2WAY-SLY
M].
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or way of behaving toward others.”64 These two notions, like the no-
tion of “categorical” itself, are independent from the actor’s inclina-
tion, motive, or desire. Irrespective of why one acts in a disrespectful
manner towards another, it remains disrespectful to the victim.65 The
treatment is gauged from the victim’s perspective, not the actor’s
mental state. Even an extreme coercive threat to the actor does not
refute the conclusion that her reactive conduct is disrespectful. In suc-
cumbing to the coercive threat, she uses the victim as a means only,
not as an end in herself.66 Because of the dire threat, again, we may
account for the coercion (or ignorance) in formulating an apt requi-
tal, but requital there must be. In sum, virtually all forms of, and rea-
sons for, disrespectful attitudes and treatments retain measures of
blameworthiness.
Disrespectful treatment, Bdt, and disrespectful attitudes, Bda, both
have scalar qualities. Uncivil treatment has many depths. At the deep-
est end are vicious slavery and torture. At the shallower end, a crude
brushoff and a careless failure to reciprocate a greeting. Likewise, dis-
respectful attitudes are matters of degree. At one pole is total con-
tempt and condescension, and at the other there is mild stereotypic
prejudice and nurtured deference to biased social norms. In some cir-
cumstances, disrespectful treatment and disrespectful attitude may
greatly diverge. For example, an actor may brutally torture another
person who she believes is her moral superior on the rationale that
the victim has information that must be revealed for community wel-
fare, as where an uncooperative, principled victim is a priest who ob-
tained privileged information about a terrorist threat from a penitent
confessor.
Once we perceive the scalar qualities of the two facets of Disre-
spect Blameworthiness, we face difficult issues relating to degrees.
Thresholds are again suggested for plausible requitals. Different
thresholds for different requitals are reflected in social norms. For
disrespectful treatment, Bdt, a standard legal remedy for criminal as-
64. Manner, OXFORD ENGLISH (US) DICTIONARY (2016), https://en.oxforddictionaries
.com/definition/manner (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/74NW-NKSX].
65. This differs from the case, taken up below, in which the actor is ignorant that she
is “treating” the victim at all. That is, if the actor, as a reasonable person, cannot foresee
that another person is at risk from her conduct, then we would not say that the actor is
“treating” the victim in any manner whatsoever. See infra note 83.
66. This violates one of the forms of Kant’s categorical imperative. See IMMANUEL
KANT, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 41, 80 (Mary J. Gre-
gor trans., 1996) (1785) (“So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in
the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”).
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sault has a higher threshold requirement than does tortious assault.
For example, the mens rea of criminal assault could be Bdt = 0.4, while
the intentional act necessary for tortious assault could be Bdt = 0.2. In
other words, to be subject to sanctions, one’s treatment of another
person must be more disrespectful for criminal liability than for civil
liability. Mens rea is a more demanding standard than is the standard
for tortious intentional conduct.67 On the other hand, some requital
may be appropriate for disrespectful treatment that falls below the
thresholds for legal relief. In these instances, social norms may call for
the disrespectful actor to respond in some extralegal manner. For
minimal disrespect, say, Bdt = 0.05, a quick apology may suffice. As the
rude treatment moves up the scale, more sincere apologies are called
for, ranging from a casual “mea culpa” to earnest, tearful contrition. A
gift or a public expression of remorse may be appropriate under cul-
tural norms as a way to expiate one’s particular disrespectful conduct.
These extralegal requitals may substitute for, or supplement, legal
remedies.
Finally, disrespectful attitude, Bda, also varies up and down a scale
from 0.0 to 1.0, as do the other forms of blameworthiness. Since atti-
tude is a subjective mental state, formidable epistemic problems inter-
fere with fine-grained measurements.68 For that matter, rough-
grained gauges are also challenging in most cases. As a crude aid, we
may estimate an actor’s subjective disrespectful attitude on the basis of
her objective conduct. Based on the manifested conduct, a reasonable
person standard may be invoked to infer the accompanying attitude.
This may often be a fair surrogate, yet, as seen in the example above
of the reluctant torturer of a principled priest, the disrespectfulness of
conduct and attitude may not align at all. At times there may be relia-
ble evidence of an actor’s attitude. She may make a record of her
mental state, report it to an acquaintance, or admit to it after the fact.
Nonetheless, the epistemic hurdles, since they relate entirely to privi-
leged mental states, are substantially greater here than for other forms
of blameworthiness.
The epistemic obstacles aside, sometimes the law does seemingly
take into account disrespectful attitudes. Some torts or private reme-
67. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, at 33–37.
68. Kant recognizes these epistemic hurdles. In judging legal guilt, he relies on “con-
siderations of a person’s external behavior and that person’s empirical or psychological
personality and history.” ROGER J. SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT’S MORAL THEORY 243 (1989).
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dies (may) require malice.69 Examples include the intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress,70 malicious prosecution,71 defamation or
libel of a public figure,72 and punitive damages.73 These legal doc-
trines may require different threshold levels of malice or disrespect,
varying, say, from Bda = 0.5 for punitive damages and Bda = 0.4 for
malicious prosecution.74 Even for conduct short of the reach of the
law, some social norms evaluate and vary according to the degree of a
wrongdoer’s apparent disrespectful attitude. Derisive ridicule calls for
a much greater apology or other remorseful response than does a
mild slight from misfired humor.
To reconnoiter, immediately above we have seen that the two as-
pects of Disrespect Blameworthiness, Bd, may vary from totally absent,
0.0, to maximally present, 1.0. Moreover, the degree of these two as-
pects (Bda, Bdt) may be quite independent of one another in particular
cases. All combinations are possible. Hence, as seen when discussing
the two aspects of Responsibility Blameworthiness, ignorance (Bri)
and coercion (Brc), all of the labyrinthine interconnectedness of these
two facets of disrespectfulness, including the complications from dis-
tinguishing types of harms and requitals, epistemic hurdles, etc., are
back on the table. Indeed, the difficulties are further compounded,
for now we should consider whether or how these four aspects of
blameworthiness are to be linked with one another in our social and
legal norms. Frankly, I believe refined gauges of blameworthiness are
just not possible in this world; far from it. As a practical matter, if
distinctions are to be drawn, we must adopt second-best methods. We
might leave the evaluations without explicit direction to the judgment
of our reasonable observers (e.g., juries and judges) who, as represent-
69. Hume identifies “malice” as “a joy in the sufferings and miseries of others, without
any offence or injury on their part.” DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 372 (L.A.
Selby-Bigge ed., 1975) (1739 & 1740). It “is the unprovok’d desire of producing evil to
another, in order to reap a pleasure from the comparison.” Id. at 377.
70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977).
71. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 653 (1977).
72. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1977).
74. By way of personal anecdote, several years ago I sat on a federal jury in a case
seeking ordinary and punitive damages for malicious prosecution. After we found the de-
fendants liable for malicious prosecution, the jury later reconvened to consider punitive
damages. During deliberations the foreman included my (anonymous) query in questions
to the judge: why is it necessary for us to find malice for the recovery of punitive damages
when we have already found malice for the underlying claim? The judge, clearly annoyed,
responded with double talk. A fellow juror reported to me that, as the judge left the jury
room, he was mumbling something about “law professors”.
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atives of the community,75 are to evaluate blameworthiness as best as
they can. But there is more to consider before doing so.
Let us see how we might cash out Disrespect Blameworthiness
with a requital principle that focuses primarily on fairness to the actor
who harms another’s dignity. Recall that in cashing out Responsibility
Blameworthiness with this focus on the actor, it seemed plausible to
use shortfalls from ideal responsibility (Br = 1.0) as a gauge for reduc-
ing the actor’s liability for harms up to the point where the shortfall
reaches the minimum threshold for responsibility (say, Br = 0.5). Be-
yond this point, the victim cannot recover at all because the actor is
not sufficiently responsible. Thus, a victim who suffered a $10,000 in-
jury from an actor whose measure of responsibility, Br, was 0.8 would
possibly recover $8,000. This orientation favoring the partially respon-
sible actor rejects coming at the problem from the other direction of
granting the victim a full recovery once the minimum threshold of
responsibility is reached and adding extra to that recovery amount as
the actor’s Responsibility Blameworthiness exceeded the minimum.
Under this second approach, the victim would recover her full loss of
$10,000 once the actor’s Responsibility Blameworthiness reaches the
minimum threshold of, say, 0.5, and the victim would recover an addi-
tional amount in proportion to the extent that Br exceeds 0.5. This
proposal, while (more than) fair to the victim, seems to push standard
remedial principles too far unless, perhaps, we invoke distributive jus-
tice rather than corrective justice. Distributive justice is mainly a com-
munity concern to see that the actor reaps her just deserts, positive or
negative.76 Corrective justice, on the other hand, is more of a private
matter to reestablish the ex-ante balance between the actor and her
victim.77 Under either standard of justice, the victim has no persuasive
deontic claim to recover more than her actual harms.
In discussing the two aspects of Responsibility Blameworthiness,
ignorance (Bri) and coercion (Brc), I have largely glossed over the epi-
stemic difficulties of discerning the extent to which the actor’s con-
duct is the product of shortfalls from full responsibility. It is not so
easy to gloss over the epistemic hurdles to gauging both facets of Dis-
respect Blameworthiness. Yet one aspect of it, disrespectful treatment
75. In this context, Adam Smith refers to the “impartial spectator”. See, e.g., ADAM
SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 82–85 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1976)
(1759). Hume, Smith’s friend, refers to the “judicious spectator”. See HUME, supra note 69,
at 581. For comparison of Smith’s and Hume’s understandings, see Jon Rick, Hume’s and
Smith’s Partial Sympathies and Impartial Stances, 5 J. SCOTTISH PHIL. 135 (2007).
76. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 35.
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(Bdt), while difficult to measure, may be the easiest of the four factors
to discern. It is judged by the actor’s manifested conduct with respect
to the victim. A reasonable person in the victim’s shoes can evaluate
the degree of implicit insult and defamation displayed by the actor’s
conduct. This is a community standard. Our fact-finding representa-
tive of the community, a jury or judge perhaps, can gauge this. But
when we turn to disrespectful attitude (Bda), the epistemic obstacles
reign supreme. Attitude is an entirely subjective matter. Can it be ob-
jectified to any extent? One possibility is to declare that disrespectful
attitude is to be preliminarily gauged by the disrespectful conduct it-
self. Based on the actor’s conduct alone, a reasonable onlooker would
surmise that the actor’s choice to act in a way that puts the victim at
such risk reflects a certain degree of disrespectful attitude toward the
victim. This establishes the prima facie baseline. Then, insofar as the
actor’s actual attitude was truly less disrespectful than supposed, as in
the priest-torturer hypothetical above, it is incumbent on the actor to
so demonstrate. Inversely, if the actual attitude was more disrespectful
than supposed, the burden of proof is on the victim. Second-best solu-
tions such as this may be the best we can do for these types of issues.
Above, we examined cases in which the actor’s Responsibility
Blameworthiness surpasses the threshold for recovery. When we
turned our primary attention to the harmed victim, attempting to be
protective of her security interest irrespective of the consequences to
the actor’s liberty interest, we contemplated whether one might add
more to the victim’s recovery or subtract less from it in proportion to
how much the actor exceeded the threshold or fell short of the ideal.
These complications are not present in the context of Disrespect
Blameworthiness. The actor’s heightened disrespect beyond the
threshold increases the victim’s dignitary harm. It may also exacerbate
the victim’s other types of harms, especially her psychic harm. Insofar
as the relevant substantive or requital principles fully protect the vic-
tim’s dignitary interest, the actor has no complaint that she is liable
for more than the victim’s actual harm. A dignitary harm is real.
III. Connections Between Responsibility Blameworthiness, Br,
and Disrespect Blameworthiness, Bd
The discussion of the four aspects of blameworthiness has thus
far treated each one of them as primarily univocal and independent
of the others. Regarding Responsibility Blameworthiness, the facets of
ignorance, Bri, and coercion, Brc may seem to have an unconditional
significance and stand quite apart from one another. Yet there are
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situations where they are subject to diverse perspectives and interrela-
tionships. Some hypotheticals will help develop these ideas.
Suppose that Jan is driving alone late at night in an unfamiliar,
sparsely populated area when she notices that a stranger, Bob, is trail-
ing her suspiciously. When she picks up her speed and uses other eva-
sive tactics, so does Bob in his car. As this action and reaction
continues to escalate, Jan feels increasing coercive duress inducing
her to attempt evasive tactics.78 Let us say it has reached the level
where Brc = 0.6. At this point she guns her engine, speeds around a
blind corner, and runs into an unanticipated car in the oncoming
lane. While Jan had reason to know that there were some cars around,
it was not very foreseeable to her that she might cause this accident,
say, Bri = 0.2. She was largely ignorant of the risk she created by her
manner of driving. Under these circumstances, we may judge that her
blameworthiness was not very substantial. Her coercive duress, after
all, measured 0.6. Still, however, the blameworthiness of the party Jan
ran into was, presumably, 0.0. Thus, even though we may declare Jan
sufficiently blameworthy to hold her liable for tort damages under
corrective justice, possible criminal charges pursuant to retributive or
distributive justice seem to be inappropriate because of her level of
duress and ignorance.79 However, on closer examination of the cor-
rective justice overtones, the coercive duress that Jan experienced in
this hypothetical has another dimension. Because Bob was threaten-
ing Jan’s person, we may look at these events as a matter of self-de-
fense that led to Jan’s unintentional harming of a third person. Put
this way, we may be more generous to Jan by permitting her to escape
liability in tort to the third party in circumstances where the level of
duress alone, without the self-defense implications, would not free her
78. This hypothetical has aspects of both coercive duress and self-defense. In the crim-
inal context, “[w]hereas self-defense justifies the commission of a crime, coercion affirma-
tively excuses allegations of criminal conduct.” Monique M. Gousie, From Self-Defense to
Coercion: McMaugh v. State Use of Battered Woman’s Syndrome to Defend Wife’s Involvement in
Third-Party Murder, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 453, 461 (1993) (footnotes omitted). “A presump-
tion of coercion exists when the defendant demonstrates that he or she was in imminent
danger, with no opportunity to escape, and had a well-grounded fear of death or serious
bodily injury unless he or she complied with the captor’s commands.” Id. (footnote omit-
ted). For my purposes here, the distinction is not important to consideration of the under-
lying diminishment of free, autonomous choice by Jan. But Bob’s blameworthy conduct
giving rise to Jan’s privilege of self-defense distinguishes his potential claims against her
from those of any blameless person harmed by Jan’s evasive tactics.
79. For consequentialist support, see LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS: CONUN-
DRUMS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 43 (1987). On the other hand, existing criminal law doctrine
is not generous to an actor who negligently or recklessly places herself in a necessitous
situation. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.09(2), 3.02(2) (1962).
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of responsibility.80 The law may account for the deep instinct for self-
preservation.
Now let us change one of the facts of the Jan-Bob interaction. Jan
is consciously aware that there is much current traffic on the local
roads. Therefore, regarding the risk of running into another car by
her hazardous driving, Bri = 0.4. Even though her level of coercive
duress remains the same (Brc = 0.6), because of her reduced igno-
rance of the risky circumstances, we may not excuse her behavior very
much, or at all. We might say to her,
Whether we see this issue as a matter of duress alone or as self-
defense, we require you to forcefully resist this particular level of
coercion when your chosen means of responding to it is to engage
in conduct that you have so much reason to know to be substan-
tially risky to others. You are responsible and blameworthy.
Similarly, there are instances in which the level of ignorance re-
mains fixed, say, Bri = 0.4, but where the level of duress varies, say,
from Brc = 0.2 to 0.6. This occurs as Jan’s justified fear of Bob’s escalat-
ing, threatening conduct increases. Depending on the specific risk in-
volved, when the coercion is significant enough, we may (partially)
excuse the conduct, but when low, we may not excuse it at all. Al-
though the Jan-Bob hypothetical dwells on external sources of coer-
cion and ignorance, to some extent a similar analysis would apply to
internal sources, such as impulses and cognitive dissonance. In sum,
when setting the substantive and requital principles for harms from
conduct in which Responsibility Blameworthiness is impaired, we
often examine each one of its two aspects separately and from differ-
ent viewpoints, while keeping one eye on the other.
Setting aside other considerations for the moment, it may seem
when discussing these hypotheticals that our intuitions about the suffi-
ciency of Responsibility Blameworthiness mainly turn on the total ex-
tent of its two factors. That is, for a particular risk of harm to others,
the actor is liable when, say, the two factors add up to 0.9. This would
occur when Brc = 0.4, Bri = 0.5, when Brc = 0.2, Bri = 0.7, and so forth.
But it may not be so simple. It may be that one of the factors is weight-
ier than the other. Ignorance, for example, may be more important
than coercion. We might demand progressively greater resistance to
coercive pressure than we require of knowledge acquisition. For in-
stance, an increase of ignorance (Bri) from 0.3 to 0.4 may be norma-
tively equivalent to an increase of duress (Brc) from 0.3 to 0.5. In other
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 73, 75 (1977); DOBBS, supra note 20, at
169–70; KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, at 147–48.
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words, we are more sympathetic to a person’s plea of ignorance than
to her plea of proportionate coercion. These differing weights may
also occur regarding increments within each factor. An increase of
ignorance (Bri) from 0.2 to 0.4 may be weighted the same as an in-
crease from 0.7 to 0.8. This is likewise for coercion (Brc). To further
complicate matters, these varying weights may cut across the two fac-
tors. Thus, as above, an increase of ignorance (Bri) from 0.3 to 0.4 may
be weighted the same as an increase of duress (Brc) from 0.3 to 0.5,
but as the duress increases it may become relatively more weighty, as
where an increase of Brc from 0.7 to 0.8 is as weighty as an increase of
Bri from 0.3 to 0.4. For another complication, as seen in the Jan-Bob
hypotheticals, we may consider comparable levels of coercion to be
weightier when seen from one perspective (e.g., self-defense) than
when seen from another (e.g., physical duress). These identified twists
and turns are just the tip of the iceberg. When we add the many other
factors on top, such as the types and extents of harms or the relief
being sought, the matrix of blameworthiness potentially grows even
more labyrinthine.81
Unlike common cases for Responsibility Blameworthiness, the
two aspects of Disrespect Blameworthiness, treatment (Bdt) and atti-
tude (Bda), may be quite independent of one another. As in benefi-
cent paternalism, one may treat another person disrespectfully by
denying her the freedom to make a choice for herself while, at the
same time, thinking of her as one’s moral equal. This occurs occasion-
ally within family and other close relationships where one is particu-
larly protective of others. On the other side of the coin, one may treat
a person respectfully while having a contemptuous opinion of her, as
where an actor dutifully performs a contract with a member of a dis-
dained group. Since a disrespectful attitude is a mental state and a
disrespectful treatment is a manifested conduct, they center in essen-
tially different realms of human experience.
The issues relating to the hypotheticals involving Jan and Bob put
into focus some of the complications of Responsibility Blameworthi-
ness. A central facet was Jan’s relative ignorance, that is, her limited
ability to foresee the potential consequences of her possible choices in
response to Bob’s threatening conduct. When discussing Responsibil-
ity Blameworthiness, the focus on knowledge is obviously to be ex-
pected since ignorance, Bri, is one of its two aspects. When, however,
81. For an excellent example of the complexities of valuing and weighting competing
norms, see SHELLY KAGAN, THE GEOMETRY OF DESERT 591–626 (2012) (matching compara-
tive and noncomparative desert).
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we turn to Disrespect Blameworthiness, Bd, we also see ignorance, in
the form of foreseeability, playing a valorizing role for one of the fac-
tors, disrespectful treatment, Bdt. If an actor has no reason to foresee
that her conduct puts another person at risk, the act does not consti-
tute disrespectful treatment of that other person even when such con-
duct, it turns out, is indeed risky to her.82 One is hardly treating a
person disrespectfully (or at all) when one reasonably does not know
that her choice of conduct might affect the other person.83 The more
the unjustifiable risk to another is foreseeable, the more disrespectful
it is, all else equal. A similar conclusion does not follow from coercive
forces (Brc). Even when one’s harmful conduct is entirely the product
of duress, one is still treating the victim disrespectfully. The victim is
used as a means only to the actor’s ends, that is, to escape the coercive
threat.84 This relationship of knowledge, foreseeability, to disrespect-
ful treatment (Bdt) is brought out in the Jan-Bob driving hypotheticals.
Disrespectful attitude (Bda), on the other hand, remains free of this
relationship to knowledge. A person’s disrespectful mental state, while
it may well influence her chosen conduct, is ultimately independent
of foreseeability. An attitude obtains whether or not it is manifested in
conduct.
The concept of blameworthiness is clearly one of the most impor-
tant desiderata in our legal and moral norms. Conceptions of it may
play a prominent role in both substantive and requital principles. For
example, an overarching substantive principle might be: “Do not
82. The type of ignorance in issue here relates to the actor’s foreseeability of the
possible consequences of her conduct. This is to be distinguished from ignorance that
results from the lack of moral education, in particular, the knowledge that other persons
are moral equals. This latter ignorance is not fully exculpating. Under the categorical im-
perative, all persons are held to the absolute duty to respect others as equals and so treat
them. See supra note 8.
83. See ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 10, at 63; Alan Brudner, Agency and Welfare in
the Penal Law, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 21, 34 (Stephen Shute et al. eds.,
1993). For cautionary observations, see Susan A. Bandes, Is it Immoral to Punish the Heedless
and Clueless? A Comment on Alexander, Ferzan and Morse: Crime and Culpability, 29 LAW & PHIL.
433, 434 (2010) (explaining that Alexander, Ferzan, and Morse do not consider the public
policy debate).
84. That the coercive threat entails a self-defensive risk to a third party, as where Jan
evasively runs into another car, does not avoid this difficult moral quandary. Drawing a
nebulous line, the Restatement does not privilege an intentional harm to a third person
when “the harm threatened to the actor is not disproportionately greater than the harm to
the other.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 73 (1977). The self-defense privilege for
unintentional harm to a third person is unavailable when “the actor realizes or should
realize that his act creates an unreasonable risk of causing such harm.” Id. § 75.
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harm another person through blameworthy conduct.”85 If one violates
this principle, the harmed victim may bring an action in tort based on
this requital standard: “If one harms another person through blame-
worthy conduct, she is to compensate the harmed person to the ex-
tent of the harms.” Here blameworthiness is crucial to the substantive
principle, but plays an incidental role in the related requital standard.
Accordingly, we could drop blameworthiness out of the requital stan-
dard altogether by substituting, “If one violates a duty not to harm
another person, she is to compensate the harmed person to the ex-
tent of the harms.” This diminished role for blameworthiness in the
requital standard may be otherwise. Suppose this is the associated re-
quital principle: “If one harms another person through blameworthy
conduct, she is to compensate that person to the extent of the blame-
worthiness of the harms.”86 Some criminal punishment suggests a ver-
sion of this principle. When blameworthiness is a central element in
both the substantive and the associated requital principle, the ques-
tion arises whether both principles rely on the same conceptions of
blameworthiness, with all their complicating twists. Depending on the
terms and meanings of the principles, we could have one or more
thresholds for each of the four aspects of the blameworthiness in the
substantive principle grounding a claim for relief, and other thresh-
olds for the requital measure. Each of these could vary depending on
the many factors raised already, including the types or extents of the
particular harms, the relief being sought, or whether the action is pri-
vate or criminal. I will not pursue these complications further. It has
been sufficiently shown that this line of inquiry triggers a whole new
set of intricacies that possibly open a broad range of blameworthiness
fractals.
IV. Conclusion
In a society that values personal autonomy, conceptions of blame-
worthiness play a central role. First, by grounding liability largely on
blameworthy conduct, everyone’s liberty and security interests are bal-
85. Here is a substantive principle that unpacks some of the inner workings of blame-
worthiness: “Do not voluntarily choose (say, Brc = 0.4) to foreseeably (say, Bri = 0.5) impose
on another person a nonreciprocal risk of harm.”
86. Related requital standards with more detail include: “When one wrongfully harms
another person through blameworthy conduct, she is to compensate that person to the
extent of the [wrongful] harm and [responsibility, disrespect] blameworthiness.” The
bracketed terms are possible additions to the underlying standard. It seems implausible,
but possible, for one or both prongs of blameworthiness to do double duty in a substantive
standard and an applicable requital.
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anced by principles that establish rights and duties in ways that fairly
allow a person to reasonably control her fate. The potential impacts
on an actor of her possible choices and conduct are passably predict-
able. She is, therefore, in a position to make and pursue her consid-
ered choices. In these circumstances, society holds the actor
responsible for the consequences of her conduct that invade another
person’s autonomy space. In such cases, we declare the actor responsi-
bility blameworthy for harming the victim. She was neither sufficiently
ignorant of the possible harm to the victim nor substantially coerced
into her conduct.
Second, pursuant to the primary foundational justification for
protecting personal autonomy, every person is entitled to the equal
respect owed to all moral beings. By virtue of her equal moral status,
everyone has the right to be respected by others and the parallel right
to be treated with respect. Respectful attitude and treatment are both
mandated. When this overarching dual mandate is not satisfied, the
breaching party is disrespect blameworthy. We hold her liable for the
dignitary and other harms that ensue.
Blameworthiness, then, comes in two forms, each form having
two aspects. All four aspects of blameworthiness have scalar qualities.
An actor may be more or less culpable based on four separate stan-
dards. These four aspects of blameworthiness, often tortuously inter-
connected, typically play two roles. First, the various aspects of
blameworthiness may establish a minimum threshold for triggering a
legal, moral, or social principle establishing a substantive right, such
as the right not to be assaulted. Second, these four aspects of blame-
worthiness may also serve in differing ways as a minimum threshold or
(partial) gauge for determining the appropriate requital for breach of
the associated substantive right.
The intricacies in our notions of blameworthiness are further ex-
acerbated by additional considerations. Particularly noteworthy are
twists and turns within each of the four types of harms that are pro-
tected against: physical, economic, psychic, and dignitary. The extent
of the substantive protections for each of these harms varies widely, as
do their requitals. A greater source of intricacies stems from consider-
ations of comparative negligence, a concept that was mentioned
merely in passing. The liability of the actor is to be (partially) offset by
the relative blameworthiness of the victim. Depending on the relevant
substantive and requital maxims, a subtle regime may be required to
gauge the blameworthiness of the victim with the same detailed atten-
tion to the four aspects of blameworthiness and types of harms that
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was mainly focused above on the actor. Then the blameworthiness of
the two parties must be somehow compared and balanced. There is
no reason in logic alone to imply that the same weights and weighing
of factors must be applied to the victim’s conduct as to the actor’s
conduct. For one reason, the victim’s conduct is typically putting her-
self at risk, while the actor’s conduct is putting another person at
risk.87 An entirely separate dimension of complexity is thereby
introduced.
Exacerbating these complexities are many other norms deeply
woven into our social and political fabric. Utilitarian and, arguably,
virtue principles stand out, but are not alone. Historical quirks and
political tides have also left much in our narratives.88 Some of these
doubtlessly include conceptions of blameworthiness with various per-
mutations. All of these threads generate claims for accommodation in
one way or another. Hanging over all of this are enormous epistemic
problems. How can we gauge the four (or more) aspects of blamewor-
thiness, the four types of harms, or the consequences of our princi-
ples? We must often bring a machete to an operation needing a
scalpel. This article elaborates on part of what awaits us in the operat-
ing room: A bloody mess.
87. Of course, depending on the circumstances, the conduct of either the victim or
the actor may simultaneously put at risk the other party, herself, and third parties, as where
the agent drives negligently.
88. See generally, e.g., GORDLEY, supra note 39.
